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Abstract 
 
One of the key underlying causes of most major accidents can be traced to deficiencies within the 
organization’s safety culture.  The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) has directly identified safety culture 
deficiencies in their recent investigations including the March 2005 BP Texas City accident and the June 
2013 Williams Geismar Olefins Plant accident.   
 
There are many reasons as to why safety culture deficiencies exist within an organization and are not 
identified and corrected by those working within the organization.  An example could be Drift to Danger 
that is often addressed in Resilience Engineering related discussion.  Another concern is that high 
consequence/low probability events are rare, which results in a low risk perception by employees within 
systems that have the potential for severe events. 
 
One could argue that full compliance with current PSM regulations should be sufficient and would have 
prevented the major events that have drawn industry’s attention.  However, organizations, especially those 
that handle highly hazardous materials, should strive to go beyond compliance.  This is because regulations 
are designed as minimum requirements and in principle cannot cover all possibilities.  Additionally, all 
organizations should strive in gaining knowledge (i.e., don’t know what you don’t know) to improve their 
operation and safety.  Implementation of a well-designed safety culture program that includes periodic 
assessment and continuous improvement can address this concern.   
 
A well-designed safety culture program should have certain key elements.  In this paper the authors put 
forward the elements of a safety culture program that they have develop and assisted in implementation at 
their client sites.  To achieve the goal of establishing a positive safety culture management should be 
cognizant of certain concepts.  Although each organization has its own specific culture (i.e., habits and 
practices), safety culture related issues can be grouped into a limited set.  These issues include but are not 
limited to management involvement, communication, competing goals, follow through, etc.  In this paper 
the authors discuss these issues with specific examples from their observations when assisting clients.  
Safety culture programs implemented at their client site are summarized.   
 




All organizations have a safety culture, regardless if it is recognized formally or not.  One of the 
key underlying causes of most major accidents can be traced to deficiencies within the 
organization’s safety culture.  For example, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) has identified safety 
culture deficiencies in their investigations of the March 2005 BP Texas City [1] and the June 2013 
Williams Geismar Olefins Plant accidents [2].  Generally speaking, it is not possible to definitively 
state that major accidents would not happen if there were no safety culture deficiencies.  However, 
the likelihood of occurrence and consequences of the events could potentially be reduced if a good 
safety culture exists within an organization.  This is emphasized by Kathleen Sutcliffe, an expert 
in high reliability organizations, states the following with regards to the Deepwater Horizon 
accident, “A strong safety culture cannot eliminate all accidents, especially in technologically 
complex and dynamic industries. There is always a risk that an accident will happen. Strong safety 
cultures can reduce the likelihood of accidents and the severity of accidents should they occur.” 
[3] 
 
Facilities handling highly hazardous materials, that is facilities subject to high consequence/low 
probability events, are generally required to comply with Process Safety Management (PSM) 
regulations [4]  One could argue that full compliance with PSM regulations should be sufficient to 
prevent the major events.  Experience has shown otherwise.  Regulations are designed as minimum 
requirements and in principle cannot cover all possibilities.  Therefore, organizations, especially 
those that handle highly hazardous materials, should strive to go beyond compliance. 
 
High consequence/low probability events are rare events by definition.  Often, employees of 
organizations with operations that have the potential for high consequence/low probability events 
develop a low risk perception [5].  This is often attributed to the fact that event had not occurred 
at a site due to its rare nature.  This means that the employees believe that it is almost impossible 
for a high consequence event to occur within their organization and they develop a sense that they 
are capable of stopping such events before it can result in a high consequence.   
 
Implementation of a well-designed safety culture program can address the key issues and 
positively affect risk perception of employees, but improving the safety culture of an organization 
is not a quick or easy process.  The impact of safety culture on high consequence/low probability 
events is addressed in this paper.   
 
 
2. Safety Culture 
2.1 Definition  
The safety culture of an organization can be described as how work is typically conducted or 
behaviors when others are not watching.  .  A more formal definition for safety culture is provided 
by the UK Health and Safety Executive (UK HSE) as, “The safety culture of an organization is the 
product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of 
behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization's 
health and safety management.” [6]   
 
2.2 Influencers of Safety Culture and Good Traits 
Factors that influence an organization’s safety culture relevant to high consequence/low 
probability events are the following:  
 Management commitment and style,  
 Employee involvement,  
 Training and competence,  
 Communication,  
 Compliance with procedures,  
 Organizational learning,  
 Equipment maintenance,  
 Prioritizing risk assessments,  
 Management of change,  
 Ensuring proper operation of safety devices,  
 Maintaining robust emergency response capabilities,  
 Prevention through design and hierarchy of controls analysis process,  
 Control of contractor and procurement process. 
 
These factors coincide with those listed by the UK HSE [7] and with elements of PSM regulation.  
They are discussed below in the context of safety culture. 
 
Management commitment and style is the most important influencer of an organization’s safety 
culture.  If the management of an organization is truly committed to a good safety culture and 
prioritizing safety, then employees typically follow the example set by management and prioritize 
safety.  If an organization has slogans that state safety is a priority, but the actions of management 
demonstrate otherwise, the safety culture of that organization suffers.  If employees notice that 
management’s actions do not demonstrate a true commitment to prioritizing safety, then safety 
conscious employees are discouraged from speaking up about safety issues.  Another effect of a 
lack of demonstrating a commitment to safety is that those employees who are not risk averse will 
continue in their ways.   
 
Management style can also dictate the safety culture within an organization.  If management 
outright dismiss safety issues brought up by employees without properly investigating the concern, 
employees are discouraged and will stop bringing up concerns as the concerns will not be 
addressed.   
 
Employee participation is the most important influencer after management commitment and style.  
This is well recognized within the safety community and has been specifically noted in ANSI Z10-
2012 [8] of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI. The standard contains the following 
list of barriers to employee participation:  
 “Disregarding the fact that all injuries and illnesses result from exposure to hazards. 
 Perception by employees that management is primarily interested in disciplining “un-safe” 
acts without adequately addressing hazards and root causes. 
 Personnel actions, such as promotions, compensation, demotions, disciplines, and re-
assignments that are administered in such a way as to reduce or undermine the commitment 
to safety. 
 Treating worker behavior as though it is a root or underlying cause rather than identifying 
hazards or system-related causes. 
 Administering a post-accident program, such as drug testing, in a way that discourages 
injury reporting 
 Not implementing hazard recognition and control measures and/or ignoring the hierarchy 
of controls. 
 Blaming employees with undue emphasis on discipline instead of implementing system 
changes. 
 Uneven accountability – focusing on the line/hourly worker and not addressing “behavior” 
of supervisors, senior management and corporate leadership. 
 Employee perception that production takes precedent over safety and health.”  
Each bullet item above describes actions that should be avoided in order to ensure that an 
organization has proper employee participation in the safety management system. 
 
Training and competence is the next important influencer.  In this context, training and competence 
apply to both management and employees and for all aspects that can affect the safety of a system.  
A couple examples of training and competence include proper operation of the system and hazard 
identification.  
 
If a manager that is responsible for the safety of employees is not equipped with the proper training 
and competence for the duty, than the safety culture of the organization will suffer as employees 
will follow the untrained managers’ guidance or will be forced to deviate from the managers’ 
guidance.  If employees working within a hazardous system are not equipped with the proper 
training and competence for the duty, than the probability for an accident is increased as the 
untrained employee may not take the proper actions required to run the system safely.  
Additionally, employees with proper training and competence are able to identify safety issues or 
signals that the system is not operating properly so that proactive actions are taken to avoid an 
accident. 
 
Communication is the next important influencer.  If there is open communication between 
employees and management regarding safety issues, management is informed and able to be 
proactive to reduce risk.  In addition, employees are not afraid to discuss safety issues with 
management as they are aware of the proactive nature of the organization to reduce risk.  Open 
communication between managers from different parts of an organization is important as that 
promotes discussions on different approaches to solving safety issues.  Also, open communication 
between employees within or outside of a group (i.e., group within a company) promotes cross 
fertilization of ideas and approaches.   
 
The importance of communication comes across in Sidney Dekker’s discussion on good 
management is one that has a grasp on “work as imagined versus work as actually done” [9].  If 
there is a large gap between management’s understanding as to how work is actually performed, 
this indicates an inability to understand and react to risks personnel are exposed to. [9]  If there is 
open communication between management and employees, the gap should become small.  If 
management has a better gauge on how employees’ perform work, management is better equipped 
to identify deficiencies in the work process and conditions and address any issues. 
 
Compliance with procedures is the next important influencer of an organization’s safety culture.  
Organizations should have properly written procedures for all tasks associated with a system that 
has the potential for severe consequences.  If these procedures are not reviewed by competent 
personnel and updated periodically to match the work, then this is a sign of a weak safety culture.  
No system stays the same throughout its lifetime from its original design.  Systems change and 
procedures must be updated to adapt to the changes in order to assist employees in avoiding 
accidents.  If procedures are not updated to match the work as actually done, then employees will 
stop using the procedures and will adapt and follow their own unwritten process to complete tasks.  
Management may not realize that employees do not use procedures until an accident happens and 
the incident investigation process identifies the issue. 
 
A sign of a good safety culture is one in which both management and employees are aware of the 
importance of correctly written procedures and ensure that the work as actually performed in the 
field is documented within procedures. 
 
Organizational learning is the next important influencer of an organization’s safety culture.  How 
an organization reacts after an incident or near miss is an indicator of their safety culture.  If an 
organization blames the individual (without a thorough investigation) for an incident and does not 
gain any knowledge or take any action to prevent a future similar incident, the organizational 
learning aspect of their safety culture can be considered as poor.  If an organization thoroughly 
investigates the incident to gather all possible information and takes action to prevent a future 
similar incident, the organization learning aspect of their safety culture can be considered as strong.   
 
Organizations should also consider incorporating the hierarchy of controls into their organizational 
learning process.  If a system or task has experienced multiple incidents or near misses due to what 
was considered “human error”, it is more than likely that the system or task needs to be redesigned 
to reduce the likelihood for “human error”.  Blaming personnel for an incident instead of reviewing 
whether or not the system had set personnel up for failure does not improve the safety of a system.  
Additionally, organizations should seek to learn from incidents that have occurred within other 
organizations so that similar systemic errors are not repeated.  If an organization distances 
themselves from another organization (within a similar field) that has experienced an incident 
instead of seeking similarities to learn from, the organization’s learning aspect of safety culture 
can be considered as lacking.   
 
Equipment maintenance or mechanical integrity is a key element of the PSM [4] regulations.  
Proactively replacing or conducting periodic maintenance on equipment reduces the probability 
that equipment will prematurely fail and release hazardous materials.  Organizations with a good 
safety culture understand the importance of investing in equipment to prevent their premature 
failure.  For example, the BP Texas City CSB Final Incident Investigation Report found a 
deficiency in the organization’s mechanical integrity program.[1]   
 
When employees continuously request for worn down equipment to be replaced or maintained to 
no avail, employee morale is adversely affected resulting in the opinion that management cares 
more about saving money than running safely. 
 
Prioritizing risk assessments is the next important influencer of an organization’s safety culture.  
Organizations with a good safety culture understand the importance of conducting risk assessments 
to identify, understand, and mitigate risk.  It is not enough to merely conduct risk assessments.  
Organizations with good safety cultures review all unacceptable risks identified in risk assessments 
and take proactive actions to mitigate risk to as low as reasonably practicable.  Risk assessments 
include reviewing the system as a whole, including equipment design, human factors related 
issues, etc. when estimating risk.  Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), a type of risk assessment, is a 
PSM regulatory requirement.  However, risk ranking within this analysis is subjective.  
Organizations influence employees participating in a PHA based on their attitude from past PHA 
recommendations.  If management pushes back on recommendations made in past PHAs or 
discredits employee’s opinions, employees may be demoralized and lack the motivation to 
participate in future PHAs as it is unlikely for management to listen to concerns.  If management 
listens to employees and addresses all concerns brought up in a PHA, employees will be motivated 
to seek new issues in the system that need to be addressed.  
 
Management of change is clearly identified in the PSM regulations. There are many events in the 
process industry with improper management of change as an important part of the root cause.  One 
example is the Williams Geismar Olefins Plant accident in which changes were made without a 
proper change process [2].  Change is a constant in every organization.  Personnel within a system 
always strive to improve system operation and efficiency.  It is important for organizations to instill 
a culture in which personnel prioritize safety on the same level as improvements in operation and 
efficiency.  Additionally, organizations with a good safety culture have a proper Management of 
Change (MOC) process to ensure that new or unacceptable risks are not introduced due to system 
changes.  
 
Ensuring proper operation of safety devices reduces the risk of an accident.  Hazardous systems 
have different types of safeguards inherent or added to the system as layers of protection to reduce 
the probability of accidents.  It is important for organizations to maintain and test these safeguards 
routinely to ensure that they properly operate if they are needed.  Additionally, it is imperative for 
organizations to have procedures and processes in place to ensure that safeguards are always in 
service or that modifications are temporarily made to the system to ensure safety during testing 
and maintenance of safeguards.  Organizations with a good safety culture ensure that there are 
systems in place to prevent bypassing or disconnecting safeguards. 
 
Maintaining robust emergency response capabilities allows well drilled response to all events.  
Major accidents are possible within any facility that manages highly hazardous materials.  
Although these major events are rare, organizations with a good safety culture understand the 
importance of maintaining robust emergency response capabilities to reduce the consequences of 
a release if it ever occurs.  This includes proper firefighting equipment, sufficient firewater for the 
worst-case scenario, and written emergency response procedures for plausible scenarios and well 
trained personnel. 
 
Prevention through design and hierarchy of controls analysis process is recognized as an important 
element of a good safety culture.  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
promotes the Prevention through Design concept that has been incorporated in ANSI Z10 [8] in 
which risk is reduced by designing out or minimizing the effects of hazards. [10]  Organizations 
with a good safety culture understand the fact that using hindsight bias to blame an employee after 
an incident or near miss does not benefit the organization or employee in the long run.  
Implementing prevention through design concepts by adding more reliable controls to a system 
should reduce risk significantly.   
 
Control of contractor and procurement process is the next important influencer of an organization’s 
safety culture.  The PSM [4] regulations and the ANSI Standard [8] all require implementation of 
a contractor safety program.  The ANSI Standard [8] also requires a formal procurement safety 
program.  It is important that contractors that work on hazardous systems be properly trained to 
perform their duties and have formal safety programs to reduce the probability of a major accident.   
 
Regarding proper procurement, hazardous systems are designed based on strict specifications and 
it is important for equipment to stay within those bounds.  For this reason, a formal procurement 
safety program must be developed and implemented to ensure that equipment being purchased 
from vendors meet certain specifications and expectations to ensure the integrity of hazardous 
systems.   
 
2.3 Process Safety Regulations 
In the United States, facilities that contain certain hazardous materials above a certain quantity 
must comply with the Process Safety Management (PSM) [4] and Risk Management Plan (RMP) 
[11] regulations.  Both regulations require for regulated facilities to develop and maintain a process 
safety management plan to reduce the risk of a major accident.  The PSM and RMP regulations do 
not require for a safety culture assessment and improvement program to be developed and 
implemented.  
 
California has updated their version of the PSM [12] and RMP [13] regulations addressing oil 
refineries separately that includes a Process Safety Culture Assessment (PSCA) program 
requirement.  Both regulations require the PSCA to evaluate process safety leadership according 
to the following elements:: 
(1) Hazard reporting program; 
(2) Response to reports of hazards; 
(3) Procedures to ensure that incentive programs do not discourage reporting of hazards, and 
(4) Procedures to ensure that process safety is prioritized during upset or emergency 
conditions.” 
 
The California RMP regulation, in addition to the four elements listed above, also requires an 
evaluation of “Management commitment and leadership.” [13]   
  
 
2.4 Unintended Consequences of a Safety Culture Program 
It is important for those responsible with introducing and implementing a safety culture program 
to ensure that the program is not misconstrued.  The program cannot immediately reduce the 
number of incidents and near misses.  It is not possible for a safety culture program to create 
immediate change within an organization and immediately reduce the number of incidents.  Safety 
culture change takes time and an organization should not expect incident and near miss rates to 
reduce drastically in the short term.  If an organization experiences a drastic reduction in incident 
and near miss rates, it is possible that employees are not reporting incidents and near misses to 
please management.  A study conducted by The Center For Construction Research and Training 
found that there are some employees who do not report minor injuries to avoid negative 
consequences within their work environment. [14] 
 
For a safety culture program to be effective, the focus should shift away from counting incidents 
and near misses and focus on truly creating an organization where risk is managed properly.  In 
other words, risk is reduced due to a good safety culture.  It is not possible to not report serious 
injuries or fatalities within an organization.  However, a reduced incident and near miss count due 
to underreporting can lead to a false sense of security within an organization that the safety culture 
program has reduced risk in a short period of time.  It is not possible for a safety culture program, 
without true safety system management improvements, to reduce risk in a short period of time.  
Additionally, a lack of incident and near miss reporting prevents the organization from conducting 
incident investigations to identify and address root causes of the events. 
 
 
3. Risk Perception 
3.1 High Consequence/Low Probability Events 
Accidents such as the ones that occurred in March 2005 at BP Texas City [1] and in June 2013 at 
Williams Geismar Olefins Plant [2] can be considered as high consequence/low probability events.  
These types of events rarely occur within a plant, but have tragic consequences.  Within 
organizations with the potential for high consequence/low probability events, accidents do not 
occur for long periods of time, if ever at all.  This has the unfortunate result of creating a very low 
sense of vulnerability within employees and management [5].  Due to the low sense of vulnerability 
within the organization, certain issues may be allowed to progress as employees and management 
do not believe the issues can result in an accident.  This low risk perception is one example of a 
deficient safety culture and can be claimed to be an indication of safety culture deficiencies being 
allowed to proceed unchecked. 
 
3.2 Drift into Failure 
One metaphor that can explain why accidents occur is known as drift into failure.  This concept is 
described by Sidney Dekker as follows:  
“Drifting into failure is a metaphor for the slow, incremental movement of systems 
operations toward (and eventually across) the boundaries of their safety envelope.  
Pressure of scarcity and competition typically fuel such movement and uncertain 
technology and incomplete knowledge about where the boundaries actually are, result in 
people not stopping the movement or even seeing it.”[9] 
 
Systems adapt and change over time.  Due to resource limitations and other pressures, safety may 
be incrementally compromised without anyone within the system recognizing the shift.  
Organizations with a good safety culture have a better chance of identifying the drift into failure 
and taking proactive actions to prevent an accident.   
 
4. Implementing a Safety Culture Program 
4.1 The PDCA Approach 
A common approach to implementing a safety culture program borrows from the quality program, 
where a plan is devised, applied, checked and updated in an ever on-going cycle.  This is also 
known as the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) Cycle.  The ANSI Z10-2012 Occupational Health and 
Safety Management Systems Standard [8] and the Draft ISO 45001 Occupational Health and 
Safety Management System Standard [15] recommend this approach.  Draft ISO 45001 states the 
following about using the PDCA Cycle within an Occupational Health and Safety Management 
System [15]:  
“The  PDCA  model  is  an  iterative  process used  by organizations  to  achieve 
continual  improvement.  It can be applied to a management system and to each of its 
individual elements, as follows:  
 Plan: establish objectives, programmes and processes necessary to deliver results in 
accordance with the organization’s OH&S policy.  
 Do: implement the processes as planned.  
 Check: monitor and measure activities and processes with regard to the OH&S policy 
objectives, and report the results.  
 Act: take actions to continually improve the OH&S performance to achieve the 
intended outcomes.” 
 
4.2 Planning Phase 
During the Planning Phase, a timeline must be established as to when to progress to the next step 
within the PDCA Cycle, objectives of the safety culture program, responsibilities must be 
established within the formal safety culture program, how information will be communicated with 
employees and managers, when and how training will be provided, how all aspects of the safety 
culture program will be documented, how the safety culture program will be audited, etc.   
 
The planning process of developing a formal safety culture program requires for an organization 
to decide which elements or influencers it will use to guide the safety culture.  Section 2.2 of this 
article discusses important safety culture influencers that can be used to develop the safety culture 
goals of an organization.  There are other sources that can be used to establish what elements or 
influencers the organization will use to determine where the safety culture currently stands and the 
safety culture goal wished to be attained as part of the formal safety culture program. 
 
Another part of the planning process for an organization is to understand where the organization 
sits on the safety culture spectrum.  There are different recommendations of a safety culture 
spectrum.  The Shell Oil Company has developed a Safety Culture Ladder that has the following 
spectrums in order of effectiveness:  
“Pathological – Who cares as long as we’re not caught 
Reactive – Safety is important, we do a lot every time we have an accident 
Calculative – We have systems in place to manage all hazards 
Proactive – Safety leadership and values drive continuous improvement 
Generative – HSE is how we do business round here” [16] 
 
During the Planning Phase of developing a formal safety culture program, an organization needs 
to determine the criteria to use when determining the current safety culture spectrum and the safety 
culture spectrum hoped to be attained by adopting the safety culture program.  Organizations must 
be wary of placing themselves within the best safety culture spectrum.  If an organization truly 
believes that they have no safety culture deficiencies, it would be wise to request assistance from 
outside the organization to confirm that belief.  One important note to make is that an organization 
should not consider ranking themselves as being higher than “Calculative” spectrum if they 
frequently violate their internal safety procedures and applicable safety regulations. 
 
After an organization has determined their current safety culture spectrum, it then determines how 
to implement a change process to improve or increase the safety culture spectrum.  Improving 
safety culture within an organization can be completed by using the eight steps described in John 
Kotter’s Leading Change [17].  It is important to note that the Eight Step Change Process is not a 
short or easy task.  Sufficient resources must be allocated to complete the change process so that 
the organization attains the safety culture spectrum goal set during the planning phase. 
 
4.3 Do Phase 
In the Do Phase of the PDCA Cycle, the implementation of the objectives and process established 
during the Planning Phase begin.  The objectives, criteria, influencers, etc. established during the 
Planning Phase are communicated to all employees and managers within the organization.  
Additionally, Kotter’s Eight Step Change Process mentioned above is initiated in order to reach 
the safety culture spectrum goal established during the Planning Phase.  Those placed in charge of 
the Do Phase must meet periodically to determine where they stand within Kotter’s Eight Step 
Change Process and what resources are needed and barriers encountered that need to be addressed.  
A method should also be established in which employees and managers can anonymously submit 
comments regarding issues being encountered with safety culture program implementation.  The 
comments received by the personnel responsible for implementation of the safety culture program 
should be acted upon immediately or during the Check Phase if the issue is not required to be 
addressed immediately. 
 
4.4 Check Phase 
As part of the Check Phase of the PDCA Cycle, an audit of the formal safety culture program 
needs to be conducted to establish the plan has been implemented and whether the intended results 
are achieved.  The audit should be performed by personnel that do not have direct responsibilities 
within the formal safety culture program and individuals who will not benefit if the audit scores 
the organization as having an incredible safety culture.  The audit should be conducted both in the 
field and via surveys sent to all employees and managers within the organization.  The surveys 
should contain questions to assess the organization’s performance for each safety culture 
influencer identified in the organization’s formal safety culture program.  The surveys should be 
anonymous to ensure that personnel do not fear any repercussions due to their survey responses.  
The field audit should include observing how personnel work as part of their normal duties.  
Additionally, the field audit should include interviews of employees who work in the field to assess 
whether or not there are any safety culture deficiencies.  The field audits should remain anonymous 
as well.  The good safety culture traits described in Section 2 should be used to identify whether 
or not the organization is acting contrary to those traits.   
 
4.5 Act Phase 
As part of the Act Phase of the PDCA Cycle, the organization should develop recommendations 
to correct the safety culture deficiencies identified in the Check Phase of the PDCA Cycle.  The 
Act Phase allows an assessment of the strides made to an organization’s safety culture after 
implementation of a formal safety culture program.  
 
 
5.0 Observed Safety Culture Traits 
As part of auditing organizations for compliance with the PSM and RMP process safety 
regulations, the authors of this paper have noticed many poor safety culture traits.  A frequently 
observed poor safety culture trait includes hesitation to invest in safety improvements.  Companies 
with good safety cultures understand the business case for safety and act on that belief.  
Additionally, OSHA describes the benefits of investing in safety programs as follows: 
“Employers that invest in workplace safety and health can expect to reduce fatalities, 
injuries, and illnesses. This will result in cost savings in a variety of areas, such as lowering 
workers' compensation costs and medical expenses, avoiding OSHA penalties, and 
reducing costs to train replacement employees and conduct accident investigations. In 
addition, employers often find that changes made to improve workplace safety and health 
can result in significant improvements to their organization's productivity and financial 
performance.” [18] 
 
During audits to identify safety culture deficiencies, the auditor should listen for statements 
demonstrating how an organization views investing in safety and how much actual investment has 
been made in safety compared to other organizations of similar size and risk.  Safety culture 
auditors should ascertain how much push back employees receive from management when they 
recommend implementing safety measures that require investment.  If management often refuses 
to invest in safety, employees will eventually stop communicating needed safety improvements to 
management.  This results in a gap between how the employees and management understand 
system operation. 
 
Another frequently observed safety culture deficiency is a culture in which management blames 
employees for incidents and near misses instead of trying to understand the system deficiencies 
that led to the event.  The blame is not always blatant.  If incident investigation reports frequently 
recommend employee retraining on procedures, this is an obvious sign that the organization is not 
learning from events.  Many times, an event that recommended retraining will recur in the future 
once the focus on that event has subsided and personnel resume their routine.  Companies that 
demonstrate good safety culture traits understand that after an event, the system needs to be 
redesigned following prevention through design concepts to reduce the probability of future 
recurrence. 
 
Another frequently observed safety culture deficiency involves contradiction in written safety 
slogan.  Often we see a placard reading “Safety is the Number 1 Priority”.  In general, companies 
are in business to make a profit.  If a company does not make a profit, it cannot exist.  Therefore, 
in practice safety cannot be number 1 priority.  This truth is not missed by the employees.  
Management’s behavior often determines where safety is placed with respect to profitability and 




High consequence/low probability events generally involve highly hazardous operations.  The low 
probability aspect of these events arises from the implementation of programs and practices based 
on current Process Safety Management (PSM) and Risk Management Plan (RMP) regulations and 
industry practices.  Despite all the efforts to eliminate such events, industry has experienced a 
string of major events.  Investigation of these events has often led the investigators to issues related 
to safety culture as a root cause of the environment that produced the event.  Only in a few isolated 
cases, regulations address safety culture and in those cases not all relevant issues are brought forth.   
 
Safety culture is a nebulous idea and there is a large variation on how it is implemented and 
measured.  However, it is possible to break down the concept of safety culture into its elemental 
parts (e.g., management commitment, training and management of change).  Each part requires its 
own method for implementation but collectively they establish the safety culture of the 
organization.   
 
To measure whether a safety culture program is good is also difficult.  Several methods and criteria 
have been developed and generally they are based on reviewer’s opinion.  Despite these 
difficulties, it is possible to establish whether on safety culture is better than another if the 
differences are large.   
 
Safety culture has much similarities with a good quality assurance program.  The 
Plan/Do/Check/Act (PDCA) cycle developed for quality programs can be applied here as well.  
Similar to quality program, it requires management involvement and can be achieved over time 
with much patience and determination.  The safety culture program should address all aspects or 
elements within an organization that affect risk (e.g., management commitment to safety, 
employee participation, hazard reporting, etc.). If the safety culture program strives to identify and 
address deficiencies within all elements that affect risk within an organization, then risk reduction 
can be realized. 
 
In summary, culture change has been studied for decades and it is concluded that improving the 
safety culture within an organization is not a quick or easy process. Safety culture change requires 
commitment from the highest levels within an organization, planning, time, and financial 
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